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        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities
        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities

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        Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-Strategic Agents: Taxes versus Quantities

        ABSTRACT

        This paper studies a dynamic game where each of two large blocs, of fossil fuel importers and exporters respectively, sets either taxes or quotas to exercise power in fossil-fuel markets. The main novel feature is the inclusion of a “fringe” of non- strategic (emerging and developing) countries which both consume and produce fossil fuels. Cumulated emissions over time from global fossil fuel consumption create climate damages which are considered by both the strategic importer and the non-strategic countries. Markov perfect equilibria are examined under the four combinations of trade policies and compared with the corresponding static games where climate damages are given (not stock-related).

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        DOCUMENT INFO

        • TypeReport, Research Paper
        • PriceFree
        • FormatPDF
        • Size361 KB
        • LanguageEnglish
        • Stacks0
        • Postedabout 4 years ago
        • Authored-
        • Added byHashdoc Content Review
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